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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this appeal lies in rhe

Utah Court of

Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §7^-2a-3(2)(e) in that
this is an appeal from the District Court iji a criminal case not
involving a first or a capital degree felony.
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal of a criminal conviction of Defendant on
four courts of theft and from the denial of a new trial,
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did trial counsel!s numerous failures of trial preparation
and investigation fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and amount to constitutionally ineffective assistance of
counsel requiring a new trial where such failures included the
following:
1.

Failure to obtain and examiiie available material

evidence critical to his clients main defense which deprived the
Defendant of the use of exonerating evidence at trial.
2.

A nearly complete failure to investigate potential

factual defenses prior to trial.
3.

Failure to examine all of thi relevant and material

evidence held by the prosecution when the prosecution several
times offered to allow such examination prior to trial.
4.

Failure properly to prepare himself and his wit-

nesses for trial.
5.

Failure to produce a key witness and to elicit

crucial testimony at trial.

Is there a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the trial would have
been different?
Was the trial Courts inclusion, without a cautionary instruction in its charge to the jury of a civil statute admitted
into evidence forbidding acts with which the Defendant was not
charged, prejudicial error requiring a new trial?
Was instruction No. 25 to the Jury so misleading and confusing as to amount to prejudical error requiring a new trial?
Did the trial court err in failing to instruct the jury with
regard to specific intent?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Const. Amend. VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV
. nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .
Utah Const. Art. I, §12
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel

....

Utah Const. Art. I, §7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.

_9

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction on four counts of second
degree felony theft, from the judgment entered pursuant to that
conviction and from the denial of Defendant-Appellantfs Motion
for a New Trial.
This case was initiated by information filed March 14, 1985
charging five counts of second degree felony theft.
The preliminary hearing was held May 8, 1985 at which
hearing Count 5 of the information was dismissed (Record
at 4, 5).
The Defendant was arraigned on June 6, 1985 (R at 27).

From

the arraignment in June of 1985 to trial iji July of 1987 trial
dates were set and vacated four times.

This trial was set to be

heard on September 25, 1985 (R at 27), February 19, 1986 (R at
37), June 4, 1986 (R at 38), April 7, 1987 (R at 46), and July 7,
1987 (R at 57).
Trial was held during the four days Jxjily 7 through July 11,
1987 with the jury returning verdicts of (guilty on all four
remaining counts.

(R at 80-84)

Defendant's motion for a new trial w^s filed October 23,
1987, immediatel}?- after he was committed to prison.

The trial

court denied Mr. Crestanifs Motion for New|Trial on November 23,
1987 (R at 5, T. Nov. 23, p. 3).
The notice of appeal was filed thereafter on November 23,
1987.

(R at 224-230, T. Nov 23, p. 7).
-3-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Over the years the Defendant, James Crestani, worked

his way up in the organization of Alta Title Company in Salt Lake
City, Utah until by 1980 he had acquired 100Z of the stock of
that corporation. (T. Vol. IV to p.p. 502, 503)
2.

On February 10, 1982 Alta Title Company opened a bank

checking account at Sandy State Bank, Sandy, Utah, which account
was known as MMD-2 (Exhibit 17-P).
3.
Company.

MMD-2 was one of several accounts used by Alta Title
It was in existence for approximately 13 months until

March of 1983 when Alta Title ceased doing business.

(Defendant

Exhibit 1-d, p. 4) .
4.

MMD-2 was an active commercial banking account which

during 1982 experienced hundreds of deposits and disbursements
amounting to millions of dollars in transactions in some months.
(Exhibits IIP, 17P, 18P, 20P, 21P, 22P, 23P, 24P, T. Vol. II p.
158-161)
5.

Although opened as a commercial account in the name of

Alta Title the account was initially opened with a $10,000.00
deposit from the personal funds of Defendant Crestani (T. Vol.
Ill p. 412) and during the life of the account numerous other
deposits of funds owned by or due to Defendant Crestani were made
into MMD-2.

(T. Vol. Ill, p.p. 410-412, 416, 417, T. Vol. IV, p.

508, 509, Defendants Exhibit 1-d).

-4a n . i <«r_Q //.

6.

In March of 1985 James Crestani wks charged in a five

count information with theft of monies from the MMD-2 account.
(R at 21-23) (A fifth count involving anothjer account was later
dismissed.
7.

R at 7)

The gist of the charges contained in the information

was that on four occasions in 1982 (on May 7, May 18, June 11 and
August 13) the Defendant had withdrawn amounts from the MMD-2
account and used the money for his own personal benefit.

It was

further implied in the Probable Cause Statement appended to the
information that this conduct constituted theft because MMD-2 was
an account used exclusively for funds held in escrow for real
estate closings and therefore, by the very fact of withdrawal,
the Defendant had stolen escrow monies.
8.

(R at 23)

Shortly after the information wa^ filed in this matter

Defendant Crestani approached Mr. Phil L. Hansen, Attorney,
(ntrial counsel") and requested trial couns^1 to represent him in
this case.
$50,000.00.

Trial counsel agreed to do so for a flat fee of
Trial counsel agreed to accep t a cash downpayment

toward the fee with the rest payable over time secured by a note
and a pledge of personal property to be h^!Id by trial counsel,
(Affidavit of James V. Crestani, R at 284, 285)
9.

In his initial conversations wit|h trial counsel, Mr,

Crestani told trial counsel that his defense to the charges was
that the money withdrawn from MMD-2 was personal money belonging
to Mr. Crestani.

(Affidavit of James V. Crestani, R at 285).

10.

Mr. Crestani described to trial counsel the large

amount of preparation and auditing of the MMD-2 account that Mr.
Crestani felt was necessary to prepare this case for trial,
trial counsel assured Mr. Crestani that he would do a thorough
and more than adequate job and that for the stated fee trial
counsel would identify and interrogate all witnesses, thoroughly
review all bank accounts involved including all relevant deposits
and withdrawals.

Trial counsel assured Mr. Crestani that he

would travel to California to prepare Mr. Crestani and his wife
for their testimony at trial and would hire paralegals to prepare
witnesses and exhibits, thoroughly research the case law and
perform all other efforts necessary to prepare the case for trial
properly and adequately.

(Affidavit of James V. Crestani, R at

285)
11.

After he was hired by Mr. Crestani, trial counsel was

approached by one James A. Mclntyre, an attorney who had
previously represented Mr. Crestani and Alta Title Company.

Mr.

Mclntyre related to trial counsel his opinion that a proper
defense to the charges leveled against Mr. Crestani absolutely
required a thorough review and audit of all available records
pertaining to deposits and withdrawals of Mr. Crestanifs personal
funds into and out of MMD-2. (Affidavit of James A. Mclntyre, R
at 298)
12.

Mr. Mclntyre further offered his services and those of

Mr. Gary Carlson, a former vice president of Alta Title, to
-690:lv-3M

assist trial counsel in searching for and reviewing all of the
MMD-2 records including all deposits and withdrawals. (Mclntyre
Affidavit, R at 298)
13.

Trial counsel acknowledged Mr. MbIntyre's offer but

neither at that time nor at any time prior to trial did he use
the offered services of Mr. Mclntyre or Mr J Carlson.

(Mclntvre

Affidavit, R at 298, Affidavit of Gary Carlion, R at 206, 207)
14.

Approximately two months after the information was

filed, a preliminary hearing was held.
15.

(R it 4)

At the preliminary hearing the Defendant Crestani was

bound over on four counts of felony theft. (R at 5)

Trial

counsel called no witnesses at the preliminary hearing. (R at 4,
5)
16.

Between the preliminary hearing iii May of 1985 and the

trial two years later in June of 1987, the ^Defendant Crestani and
his wife attempted on numerous occasions to contact trial counsel
by telephone or letter regarding this case

All such attempts

were unsuccessful and Mr. Crestani was unable to either speak
with trial counsel or get him to return vzritten correspondence or
telephone calls.

(James V. Crestani Affidavit, R at 285, Supple-

mental Affidavit of James V. Crestani, R at 259, 260)
17.

This case was originally set for trial on September 25,

1985, (R at 27) thereafter it was continue^ four times.
27, 38, 46, 57)
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(R at

18.

For the trial setting February 19, 1986, counsel

appeared for pre-trial two weeks prior thereto on February 4,
1986.

(R at 38) At that time trial counsel had not obtained the

MMD-2 records from Sandy State Bank.
19.

On March 16, 1987, trial counsel prepared and served on

the prosecutor a demand for discovery.

(R at 50, 51)

Included

in the demand was a request for "an itemization of all physical
evidence, including a list of all exhibits the prosecution
intends to introduce at the time of trial.ff
20.

(R at 50, 51)

Also on March 16, 1987 trial counsel had prepared and

served upon Sandy State Bank a subpoena requesting production of
certain MMD-2 records (R at 52, 53) and a notice of records
deposition.

(R at 54, 56)

These records were not delivered at

the appointed time because trial counsel failed to pay the
copying charges requested by the bank.

(Affidavit of Shirlene

Ivory, R at 274)
21.

For the trial setting of April 7, 1987, trial counsel

prepared and filed with the court a Motion, Stipulation and Order
of Continuance on March 31, 1987, one week prior to trial.
58-60)

(R at

At that time trial counsel had not obtained the records

of the MMD-2 account.
22.

(Affidavit of Shirlene Ivory, R at 274)

The pretrial preparation of Mr. Crestanifs defense

prior to trial was primarily undertaken by a paralegal working in
trial counsel's office.
272-276)

(Affidavit of Shirlene Ivory, R at

All contacts with Mr. Grestani prior to the day before
-8-
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trial were through this paralegal or trial counsel1s secretary,
(Supplemental Affidavit of James V. Crestani, R at 260).
Defendant Crestani several times told the paralegal that the
MMD-2 records would be important to his defense (Ivory Affidavit.
R at 272). The paralegal assured Mr. Crestani that trial counsel
would obtain the MMD-2 records. (Id.)
23.

Five weeks prior to trial, the palralegal attempted to

pull the office file for trial counsel to assist him in pre-trial
preparation.

Apparently, however, trial counsel was out of the

office for long periods of time in the weeks preceding trial and
apparently trial counsel did not review th^ case file till two
days before the trial began.
271).

(Affidavit of Shirlene Ivory, R at

Defendant Crestani told the paralegal he was very con-

cerned that trial counsel was not prepared to go to trial and
that they should request a continuance. (Id. R at 274, 275).
When the paralegal relayed Mr. Crestanifs concerns, trial counsel
assured the paralegal that he was prepared. (Id. R at 275).
24.

Some weeks before trial, the pari*alegal attempted to

collect the bank records previously subpoenaed by trial counsel.
(Ivory Affidavit, R at 274)

However, the pank records had not

been paid for and had subsequently been lost.
R at 274)

(Ivory Affidavit,

The paralegal reordered the records that had pre-

viously been subpoenaed and these records were picked up two days
prior to the beginning of the trial.
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(Id.)

25.

The MMD-2 account records subpoenaed by trial counsel

included only deposit items into that account for March, April,
May and June of 1982.

Trial counsel did not request monthly

statements, checks or disbursement items, or credit and debit
memos.

Trial counsel did not subpoena any records at all for the

months of July and August, 1982, which encompassed count four of
the information.
26.

(R at 52,. 54, 55)

Trial Counsel apparently began his preparation of the

witnesses that he would later call at trial only two days prior
to the day the trial was to begin.

He first contacted defense

witness Gary Carlson two days before trial.
Carlson, R at 205)

(Affidavit of Gary

He first contacted defense witness James

Mclntyre the day before trial at which time trial counsel was
apparently preparing for a portion of the case that had been
dismissed at preliminary hearing.

(Affidavit of James A.

Mclntyre, R at 298)
27.

Trial counsel received, both directly and through his

paralegal, offers from the prosecutor to examine the documentary
evidence held by the state prior to trial.

(Affidavit of

Shirlene Ivory, R at 273, T. Vol. Ill, p. 443)
28.

On at least two occasions prior to trial the prosecutor

offered to make available to trial counsel all of the documentary
evidence that the prosecution had developed for trial.

Further,

the prosecutor offered to go over the documents with trial
counsel and provide an investigator familiar with the case to go
through them with him.

(T. Vol. Ill, p. 443)

29.

Trial counsel never took the prosecutor up on these

offers and, in the two years between preliminary hearing and
trial, never reviewed the state's evidence including many of the
account records of MMD-2.

(Trans. Vol. IV ^. 443, T. Vol, 12 and

17, p. 42)
30.

On the evening before trial, trial counsel finally met

with Defendant Crestani and his wife. (Supplemental Affidavit of
James V. Crestani, R at 259, 260)

At that time Mr. Crestani

observed that trial counsel had only obtained deposit items for a
four month period from the MMD-2 account.

He asked trial counsel

where the rest of the account records were.
sponded, "That's all we need.

Trial counsel re-

They don't h^ve a case."

(Id. at

260)
31.

That same night Defendant Crestani asked trial counsel

why he had not secured the attendance of Blake Hammond, a former
vice-president of Alta Title Company relocated to Phoenix,
Arizona, whom Mr. Crestani had felt was an important witness.
Mr. Hammond resided in Phoenix, Arizona.

Trial counsel admitted

that he had not subpoenaed Blake Hammond but told Mr. Crestani
that in trial counsel's opinion they did not need Mr. Hammond for
the case.

(Supp. Affidavit of James V. Cre*stani, R at 261) Mr.

Hammond was never contacted by trial counsel1, was never informed
about the trial date and did not appear at the trial.
of Blake Hammond. R at 202)
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(Affidavit

32.

Prior to trial, the Defendant's wife Vickie R. Crestani

was not told by trial counsel that she would be a witness notwithstanding the fact that she had been the Escrow Department
Manager at Alta Title Company in 1982 and had been in charge of
some deposits made into MMD-2. (T. Vol. Ill p. 408, Record
Affidavit of Vickie Crestani R at 308)
33.

In his opening statement at trial, made after the

State's case, trial counsel outlined his case for the defense.
Trial counsel relied heavily on the fact that he would show that
Defendant Crestani had personal money in MMD-2 sufficient to
cover the withdrawals that were charged in the information. (T.
Vol. Ill, p. 312-315, 320-322, 326)
34.

At trial, trial counsel called attorney James A.

Mclntyre as a witness for the defense.
35.

(T. Vol. Ill, p. 340)

Trial counsel attempted to establish through the

testimony of Mr. Mclntyre several deposits of Mr. Crestani1s
personal funds into MMD-2.

(T. Vol. Ill at 346-349)

Mr.

Mclntyre was unable to recall several of the transactions and
others he could recall generally but could not specify dates or
exact amounts.

(Id.) Trial counsel did not provide Mr. Mclntyre

with any documents of deposit to substantiate his testimony or
refresh his recollection.
36.

(T. Vol. Ill, p. 346-350)

At trial, trial counsel called Vickie R. Crestani, wife

of the Defendant and former Escrow Department Manager for Alta
Title Company. (T. Vol. Ill, p. 408)
-12-

37.

Trial counsel attempted to have krs. Crestani verify

deposits of Jim Crestani1s personal funds into MMD-2 during 1982
from her own memory without reference to specific records, (T.
Vol. Ill, p. 411, 412 and 419-421)
38.

On cross-examination the Prosecutor pointed out that

Mrs. Crestani was testifying only from mempry and that she had
had many years to locate the records of the deposits that she had
testified about on direct examination.
39,

(T

Vol. Ill, p. 425)

Trial counsel also had Mrs. Crestani identify specific

deposit item records representing personal funds deposited into
MMD-2 for Defendant Crestani.
40.

(T. Vol. Ill , p. 409, 414, 416)

On further cross-examination, the Prosecutor confronted

Mrs. Crestani with records showing that the deposits she had
testified to on direct examination were immediately withdrawn
from MMD-2 and thus not available to ccjver the charged
withdrawals.
41.

(T. Vol. Ill, p. 436-439)

Trial counsel objected to cross-examination of Mrs.

Crestani using bank records of disbursements on the ground that
he had not previously seen or been given an opportunity to
examine those documents.

(T. Vol. Ill, ppJ 441-449)

The prose-

cution responded that trial counsel had indeed been offered the
opportunity to examine all the state's evidence.
42.

(Id.)

After trial counsel's objection on Thursday night, the

court recessed for the evening and instructed trial counsel and
the Prosecutor to go over the bank records! that the Prosecutor
-13-

intended to use to cross-examine Mrs. Crestani.
449)

(T. Vol. Ill, p.

Trial counsel admitted that he had never seen these partic-

ular documents before.
43.

(T. Vol. Ill, p. 452)

On further cross-examination the next day the Prosecutor

was able to establish from documentary evidence that Mrs.
Crestani withdrew a previously described $15,000.00 deposit on
the same day that it was deposited into MMD-2.
470, 471)

(T. Vol. IV, pp.

Mrs. Crestani, because she had not reviewed any bank

documents except some deposit items subponeaed by trial counsel,
was surprised and did not recall the immediate withdrawal of the
$15,000.00 until the Prosecutor showed her the disbursement item
on the last day of trial.
44.

(T. Vol. IV, p. 472)

On further cross-examination the Prosecutor was able to

show that another deposit, described by Mr. Crestani as personal
funds of the Defendant, in the amount of $19,896.73 was likewise
withdrawn on the same day.
45.

(T. Vol. IV, pp. 474-477)

On further cross-examination of Mrs. Crestani, the

Prosecutor was able to establish that many of the $50.00 agent
fees that the defense claimed were personal funds of Mr. Crestani
were withdrawn from the MMD-2 account and paid to the Alta Title
General account.
46.

(T. Vol. IV, pp. 480-484)

In his closing argument the prosecutor told the jury

that the Crestanis knew that the deposits they testified about on
direct examination were immediately withdrawn and the Defendant
and his wife were merely trying "to pull the wool over [the
jury's] eyes".

(T. Vol IV, p. 571)
_ i /. _

47.

At trial, trial counsel called th^ Defendant Crestani

as a witness.
48.

(T. Vol. IV, p. 500)

Trial counsel attempted to show with the testimony of

Mr. Crestani that he had personal funds in MMD-2 at various
times.

However, except for small deposits, from his personal

account, Mr. Crestani was only able to testify from memory
because no documents were provided to establish exact deposits.
(T. Vol. IV, p. 510)
49.

At trial the court, hearing no objection from Defen-

dant's counsel, allowed the prosecutor to question witnesses
about the co-mingling of personal and escrow funds in MMD-2 by
Defendant Crestani.
50.

(T. Vol III, p. 361, T. Vol IV, p. 524)

In his closing argument the Prossecutor pointedly

referred to the text of the statute prohibi)^ing the co-mingling
of escrow funds which had been offered by trial counsel and
received in evidence by the court.

(T. Vol IV, pp. 553-574)

Defendant Crestani was not charged with any specific offense
involving co-mingling of funds.
51.

At trial the Prosecutor elicited, without objection,

testimony from several witnesses that Defendant Crestani had
obtained or paid to Alta Title Co. the interest earned on escrow
funds deposited into MMD-2 over to Alta Title.

(T. Vol III, p.

479, T. Vol. IV, p. 526) Defendant Crestanij was not charged with
theft of interest monies.
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52.

Mr. Crestani was convicted of all four counts of second

degree felony theft.
October 23, 1987.
53.

He was sentenced and committed to prison on

(R at 191)

After the sentencing, new counsel for Mr. Crestani

hired a CPA to perform a review of the MMD-2 account.
12 and 17, p. 5)
ted to the court.

(T. Nov.

The CPA prepared two reports which were submitThe first report was submitted in open court*

and the Prosecutor agreed to its being considered as an Affidavit.

(T. Nov. 12 and 17, p. 6)

That report was not appended to

the record but is contained in the evidence box marked "Defendant's Exhibit l-dff.

The second report was submitted to the

court on November 17, 1987 and appears in the record at 302-304.
In addition, the CPA gave testimony in support of Defendant
Crestani's Motion for a new trial.
54.

(T. Nov. 12 and 17, p. 25-32)

In his review of the MMD-2 account the CPA found

records that substantiate that on June 28, 1982 Mr. Crestani
deposited $24,622.50 from his personal funds into MMD-2.
1-d, T. Vol. VI, p. 30)

(Ex.

These funds were owed to Mr. Crestani

personally as a loan repayment from one Raymond D. Fry.
Affidavit of Raymond J. Fry, R at 252, 253)

(Id.,

These funds were

still in the MMD-2 account on August 13, 1982 when the $16,500.00
withdrawal, which was the basis for Count 4 of the information,
was made.
55.

(T. Nov. 12 and 17, p. 30)
In addition, the CPA found that $50,000.00 of Mr.

Crestani1s personal funds which should have been deposited into
-16-

MMD-2 per his instructions were in fact deposited by Mr.
Crestanifs attorney James A. Mclntyre into an account at Sandy
State Bank entitled MAlta Title Contract Servicing Account11 on
August 5, 1982.

(Defendants Ex. 1-d, p. 41) The CPA found no

evidence that this deposit was never withdrawn up to and including the time when Alta Title closed its doors in March, 1983.
(Id.)
56.

In addition, the CPA found records that confirmed that

$8,865.43 was deposted into MMD-2 on September 28, 1982.
funds were personal funds due to James Cresljani.
57.

In addition, the CPA found that pver

These

(R at 303)
$500,000.00 of

funds due to James Crestani upon the sale of the Alta Title
Building were available to Mr. Crestani in

982 which funds were

deposted in bank accounts maintained by Alta Title.
58.

(R at 303)

In his closing argument the Prosecutor emphasized that

guilty intent on the part of Mr. Crestani was established because
he had made no attempt to repay the monies yithdrawn from MMD-2,
(T. Vol. IV, p. 562), that the Defendant h^d failed to produce
documentary evidence to substantiate that Mr. Crestani had
personal funds in the accounts sufficient tb cover the disbursements he was charged with (T. Vol. IV, p. 573), and that in each
specific instance where the Defendant Crestani claimed the
deposits were made in MMD-2, those funds were immediately with
drawn and therefore not available to cover the charged withdrawals.

(T. Vol. IV, p. 571)
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59.

During its deliberations the jury sent out a written

message to the court which stated "Was the money 16,500 put back
into MMD-2H.

(This record is maintained and unmarked in the

evidence box.

A copy is attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit A.)

The court responded "refer to your collective memories11.

(I_d. T.

Vol IV P. 609, 610)
60.

The CPA found that prior to the date of the last count

of the information, by which time Defendant Crestani was alleged
to have stolen Fifty Seven Thousand Three Hundred Dollars
($57,300.00), the sum of Seventy Six Thousand Six Hundred One
Dollars and Twenty Three Cents ($76,601.23) representing personal
funds of the Defendant Crestani had been deposited by or for
Crestani into MMD-2.

The CPA also found that additional personal

funds of Defendant Crestani were deposited into MMD-2 subsequent
to August 13, 1982.

(Defendant's Ex. 1-d, p. 4)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Minimal standards of criminal justice and due process
require that defense counsel in a criminal case adequately
prepare for trial by gathering as much information as possible
about the case, including possible defenses.

Where, as in this

case, defense counsel is informed at the outset that his client's
major defense may be proved or supported by an examination of
bank account records, defense counsel's duty to thoroughly
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examine those records and present at triall such exculpatory
records as he is able to find is even more compelling.
Defense counsel's utter failure to perform any significant
investigation of the relevant records on the MMD-2 account fell
far below the minimum standards set forth above and prevented
Defendant Crestani from presenting evidence at trial that would
have completely exonerated him under one count of the information
and substantially supported good defenses | to the remaining
counts.
Numerous other failures of investigation and failures of
preparation exacerbated the problem of ineffective assistance of
counsel and provide ample evidence of triaJL counsel's lack of
diligence in the case.
This lack of diligence can in no way bfe called mere strategy.

It is clear that trial counsel relied heavily at trial on

the very defense that his failure of preparation prevented him
from establishing.

The circumstances surrounding trial counsel's

belated, hurried and error-ridden preparation belie any claim
that he intentionally avoided for tactical Reasons a full investigation of the MMD-2 account.
In this case, even a brief examination of MMD-2 and related
accounts performed after sentencing by new counsel resulted in
discovery of deposits that would have exonerated the Defendant
from guilt on one count.

Other personal (funds of Defendant

Crestani that were discovered to have been (deposited into MMD-2
-19-

or that were available to him in other accounts provide strong
evidence that would have supported Defendant Crestanifs defense
of mistake or lack of intent to permanently deprive.

The evi-

dence obtained after trial establishes much more than a reasonable probability that the result at trial would have been different but for counsel's failures.
At trial, trial counsel further failed in his duty to assert
legal defenses and objections to protect his client's rights.
The prosecutor frequently and consistently elicited testimony
regarding co-mingling of funds and unauthorized appropriation of
interest monies from MMD-2, which uncharged misconduct evidence
was severely prejudicial and objectionable under Rules 403 and
404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

The admission of this testi-

mony was severly prejudicial to the Defendant's right to a fair
trial and trial counsel's failure to object thereto falls below
standards for minimum competency of representation.
The instructions given to the jury in this case were extremely confusing and prejudicial to the rights of the Defendant
Crestani.

One instruction (No. 25) virtually required conviction

if the jury found that MMD-2 had been used as an escrow account
(which the Defendant admitted).
Another instruction (No. 16) specifically outlined numerous
unlawful acts involving escrow accounts, co-mingling of funds and
use of interest from escrow accounts.

The prosecutor during

trial elicited testimony from numerous witnesses that each of
-20an.-Ur-'}//.

these acts occurred at Alta Title during the relevant time
period.

However, none of these alleged unlawful acts contributed

directly to proof of the counts charged and no cautionary instruction was given.

The combination of these instructions was

extremely unfair and prejudicial to Defendant Crestani.

These

improper instructions were excepted to by trial counsel and the
failure to exclude them justifies a new trial.
Other essential instructions requested! by trial counsel were
improperly rejected by the Court.

The Cour|tt refused to instruct

the jury on the specific intent required |to sustain a theft
conviction.

This lack of proper instruction also justifies a new

trial.
The evidence is overwhelming that trial counsel's lack of
effective and necessary preparation and investigation and the
resultant unavailability of evidence establishing good defenses
to the charges, exacerbated by the admission of extremely prejudicial and inadmissible evidence at trial and the giving of
misleading and unlawful instructions to tlje jury, combined to
allow an unjust conviction of this defendant in what must be
described as a gross miscarriage of justiqe.
only be remedied by a new trial.

_91 _

These errors may

ARGUMENT
I.
TRIAL COUNSEL'S TRIAL PREPARATION FELL FAR BELOW
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD OF REPRESENTATION AND RESULTED
IN THE UNJUST CONVICTION OF DEFENDANT
The right to the effective assistance of counsel is fundamental to American concepts of constitutional liberty and is
"rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people1'. Alires
v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 121, 449 P.2d 241, 243 (1969).

In

modern case law, the emphasis on effective assistance is evident
and the mere appearance of an attorney on behalf of an accused
does not satisfy the constitutional standard.

The Utah Supreme

Court has observed that an accused
is entitled to the assistance of a competent
member of the Bar, who shows a willingness to
identify himself with the interests of the
accused and present such defenses as are
available under the law and consistent with
the ethics of the profession.
State v. McNichol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976) (emphasis
added).
If an attorney at trial is ignorant of facts or law which
would constitute a defense, the trial is reduced to a farce and a
sham.

Such circumstances constitute inadequate or ineffective

assistance of counsel.
(Utah 1978).

State v. Pierren, 582 P.2d 69, 70-71

The ineffective assistance of counsel is a "depar-

ture from due process of law" and requires a remand for new
proceedings.

Alires, 449 P.2d at 243.
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In the trial of this case, trial counsel was completely
ignorant of numerous facts constituting complete or substantial
defenses to the charged counts because he failed to perform even
the most cursory examination of the records <pf the MMD-2 account.
This failure is shocking in light of the fact that trial counsel
was informed at the outset that Mr. Crestani believed his primary
defense to be that he had deposited sufficient funds into the
MMD-2 account to cover the charged withdrawals.
It is incumbent upon every criminal defense lawyer to
investigate with reasonable thoroughness all| areas of potentially
exculpatory factual defenses.
It is the duty of the lawyer to cbonduct a
prompt investigation of the circumstances of
the case and to explore all avenues leading
to facts relevant to the merits of the case
American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, Defense
Function, 4-4.1
It is an elementary principle that wheti defense counsel is
pointed to an available body of records and informed by his
client that those records contain the proof of his innocence,
counsel's duty to thoroughly examine those records to confirm his
defendant's claim is even more compelling.
The United States Supreme Court has set] forth the standard,
according to the effective assistance of counsel and due process
rights guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
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U.S.

Constitution,

against

which

criminal

counsel's

representation must be measured. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.ed. 2nd, 674 (1984).

Under this

standard, any defendant claiming ineffective assistance of
counsel has the burden of showing: (1)

counsel's representation

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) a
reasonable probability that, but for the counsel's unprofessional
errors the results of the proceeding would have been different.
Id. 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 2067.

The reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
Id. at 2068, State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986)
In a pre-Strickland case, the Utah Supreme Court set forth a
usable objective standard of reasonableness in cases where trial
counsel's pretrial preparation and investigation is challenged.
The court recognized
the vital distinction between those cases
where counsel failed to make a careful,
factual and legal investigation necessary for
a constitutionally adequate defense and those
wherein counsel, after making such an investigation, decides for tactical or strategic
reasons, which from benefit of hindsight may
appear wise or unwise, not to utilize the
fruits of his labor.
State v. McNichol, 554 P.2d at 203, 204 (Utah 1976).
The McNichol "vital distinction" can be made in the instant
case without difficulty.

The record is replete with evidence of

trial counsel's egregious failures of preparation and investigation.
-24on . i IT-'* //.

A.

Trial Counsel's Failure to Obtain and Examine Avail-

able, Material Evidence Critical to his Client's Main Defense
Deprived the Defendant of the use of Exonerating Evidence at
Trial and Amounted to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Trial counsel was informed at the outset of his representation in March, 1985, that defendant Crestanl's main defense was
that he had deposited sufficient personal ffunds into MMD-2 to
cover the alleged thefts.

Trial counsel accepted a large fee on

the grounds that much preparation, investigation and auditing of
bank records would need to be accomplished prior to trial. Alta
Title's former counsel and a former vice president offered their
services to trial counsel to assist him in the crucial task of
examining the records of MMD-2.
Notwithstanding the instruction of his|client and the offer
of help to do so, trial counsel made virtually no effort to
examine the bank records prior to trial.

Nearly two years after

the preliminary hearing, trial counsel issued subpoenas for
portions of the MMD-2 records for a four njonth period.

This

subpoena did not request any of the record^ covering the full
time period involved in the state's charges.) Additionally, trial
counsel subpoenaed only deposit items and rjeglected to request
withdrawals, monthly statements or other records of the account
necessary to understand the transactions.
Even this incomplete effort was rendelred nearly useless
because trial counsel neglected to pay the bopying fees and the

records were subsequently lost and had to be reordered.

Thus,

even those pitifully few MMD-2 records so vitally needed were not
acquired by trial counsel until two days before the trial.
Trial counsel had other sources whereby he could have
examined the MMD-2 records including the State's evidence itself.
On several occasions the prosecutor offered to allow trial
counsel to examine all of the records held by the State and even
to supply an investigator to help explain the records.

In the

two year period between the preliminary hearing and trial, this
offer was ignored.
At trial, trial counsel attempted to establish defendant
Crestani1s main defense without himself having a knowledge of the
history of the account, without giving his primary witnesses the
benefit of a refreshed recollection of the account, and without
significant records to establish and corroborate their testimony.
The results were predictable and devastating to the defense.
After the trial, trial counsel was discharged and new
counsel was hired.

New counsel engaged the services of a Cer-

tified Public Accountant to perform the examination of the MMD-2
records that Mr. Crestani had been assured would be done prior to
trial.

The results of that examination are contained in the two

reports of Leland Martineau, CPA contained in the record.
(Defendant's Exhibit 1-d, R at 302-304).
In his abbreviated, one-week investigation, the CPA was able
to establish that the amount of $24,662.50 which represented
0£

funds due personally to Defendant Crestani were deposited into
MMD-2 on June 28, 1982.

The CPA found that those funds were in

the account and available to cover the withdrawal in the amount
of $16,500.00 on August 13, 1982, upon whicth Count 4 of the
information was based.
In addition, the CPA found that personal funds of the
Defendant Crestani of at least $76,000.00 had been deposited by
or for Defendant Crestani into MMD-2 in the period May through
August, 1982, which period encompassed the charges in the information.

Though much of this was withdraw^ prior to the

withdrawals charged in the information, using MMD-2 account
records to give a context to the recollection of Mr. Crestani,
the CPA found evidence that Mr. Crestani majf not have known of
all of withdrawals.
In addition, the CPA found that the sum of $50,000.00 that
Defendant Crestani had directed be deposited into MMD-2 on
August 5, 1982, was in fact deposited in another account maintained by Alta Title known as the Alta Titl0 Contract Servicing
Account.

The CPA found no evidence that thii money was withdrawn

up to and including the time that Alta Titl^ ceased doing business in March, 1983.

This money was therefore available to be

withdrawn or cover any overdrafts of the Defendant's personal
funds in MMD-2.

This evidence further establishes the likelihood

that Defendant Crestani may have reasonably believed that that
money was available to cover withdrawals of funds from the
account.

It appears clear that defense counsel's utter failure to
perform any significant pretrial investigation of the relevant
records of the MMD-2 account fell far below the minimum objective
standards of reasonable representation required by the Strickland
test.

Far worse however, is the fact that trial counsel's

ignorance of the contents of the MMD-2 records prevented Defendant Crestani from presenting evidence at trial that would have
surely exonerated him under count four of the information and
would have substantially supported the defenses to the remaining
counts.
Under the circumstance presented in this case, trial counsel's failure to investigate, in the face of repeated pleas from
his client presents, one of the most blatant cases of ineffective
assistance of counsel imaginable.

Nor can trial counsel's

failure be excused as mere error in strategy.
From his opening argument, and through his interrogation of
witnesses and his closing comments to the jury, trial counsel
attempted vainly to establish Defendant Crestani's main defense.
It is clear that he relied heavily on the very defense that his
failure of preparation prevented him from establishing.

The

circumstances surrounding trial counsel's belated, hurried and
error-ridden preparation belie any claim that he intentionally
avoided for tactical reasons a full investigation of the MMD-2
account.

B.

Trial Counsel's Additional Failure^ of Investigation of

Facts and Preparation of Witnesses Additionally Damaged His
Ability to Present a Defense and Amounted to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Although the inexcusable and almost unbelievable failure of
trial counsel to prepare his client's main defense is serious
•I »
enough to require reversal by itself, counsel's
lack of diligence

in other aspects of trial preparation is evident throughout the
record and can be illustrated by the following points:
1.

Trial counsel did virtually no preparation for trial

during the nearly two years between the preliminary hearing and
trial.

He relegated what preparation was done to an inexperi-

enced paralegal and did not open his files utitil two days prior
to trial.

In addition, during that time trial counsel avoided

contact or communication with the Defendant s\.nd the key witnesses
in the case.
2.

Trial counsel apparently began his preparation for this

four-day trial two days before the trial actually began.

He

contacted the key witnesses over the phone and his preparation of
those witnesses was cursory and misguided,

we began his prepara-

tion of the Defendant for his testimony the night before trial
and deflected anxious questions about his trial preparation with
hollow assurances. He never told Defendant's wife that she would
be a witness until 3 days into the trial.

In| fact, he apparently

did not intend to call her since he did not identify her to the
jury as a potential witness despite the fact that she had been in
charge of escrow accounts and had made key deposits in MMD-2.
3.

Trial counsel's attempt to subpoena bank records crucial

to his clients defense was woefully incomplete and sloppily
handled.
4.

Trial counsel failed to perform other crucial inves-

tigation that resulted in the lack of needed evidence at trial.
For example, he failed to obtain documentary evidence that James
Crestani was entitled to agency fees paid by the Bajan partnerships amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars.

In addition

he failed to interview and subpoena a key witness (Blake Hammond)
who would have given testimony discrediting the prosecution's
only accountant witness (Roger Piburn). (Affidavit of Blake
Hammond R at 200-203).
Counsel's duty to investigate facts and interview witnesses
possessing relevant information exists whether or not counsel
believes his client's claims.

Jennings v. State, 744 P.2d 212

(Okl. Cr. 1987)
When counsel knows of the existence of a
person or persons who possess information
relevant to his client's defense, and he
fails to use due diligence to investigate
that evidence, such a lack of industry cannot
be justified as "strategic error".
Id. at 214. Citation omitted.
The predictable and tragic consequence of trial counsel's
lack of preparation was painfully evident at trail.
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Witnesses

were asked to testify from memory as to specific deposits made
over five years prior to trial.
substantiate their testimony.

Few documents were available to
In addition, rebuttal evidence

presented by the State, of which trial counsel and his witnesses
were unaware, effectively destroyed their testimony and their
credibility before the jury and allowed the prosecutor to argue
that the Defendant and his witnesses were attempting to "pull the
wool over the [jury's] eyes".
C.

There Exists at Least a Reasonably Probability that,

but for Trial Counsel's Unprofessional Errors, the Result of the
Trial Would Have Been Different.
The second prong of the Strickland test! requires a determination as to whether or not the result at trial would have been
different had it not been for trial counsel's below-standard
representation.

As the court in Strickland stated

The benchmark for judging any claim of
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's
conduct so undermined the proper functioning
of the adversarial process that trie trial
cannot be relied on as having produced a just
result.
Strickland at 2064.

The Utah Supreme Court citing Strickland

further defined the standards to be met by a Iclaim of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Defendant must prove what specific, identified acts or omissions fall outside the
wide range of professionally competent
assistance. The claim may not be speculative, but must be a demonstrative reality,
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sufficient to overcome the strong presumption
that counsel rendered adequate assistance and
exercised "reasonable professional judgment11
• • • •

Furthermore, any deficiency must be prejudicial to defendant. It is not enough to claim
that the alleged errors had some conceivable
effect on the outcome or could have had a
prejudicial effect on the fact finders
However, these principles are not applied as
a mechanical test, but are guides to the
ultimate focus upon the fundamental fairness
the proceeding challenged. The purpose of
the inquiry is simply to ensure the defendant
receives a fair trial.
State v. Frame, 823 P.2d 401, 404 (Utah 1986).
Applying the above standards to this case, it is clear that
trial counselfs preparation fell well below the minimum level of
his duty to his client.

Further, it is clear beyond any

speculation that had trial counsel performed an adequate
investigation of MMD-2, the jury verdict as to count four would
have been completely different.
It is also clear that had the Defendant and his wife been
able to refresh their recollections as to the sequence of deposits and withdrawals from MMD-2, they would likely not have been
made out to look like liars in front of the jury.
In addition, it is probable that had the jury heard the
evidence of tens of thousands of dollars of deposits of the
Defendant's personal funds into MMD-2 before and after August 13,
1982 and to other accounts of Alta Title, they would have felt

-1?-

very differently about the elements of unauthorized control and
intent to permanently deprive.
It is apparent that the jury was concerned about this issue
from its note to the court during deliberations.

The note asked

the question "Was the money 16,500.00 put bkck into MMD-2"

The

court's very appropriate response "refer to your collective
memories", was probably not very helpful to the jury because of
the lack of specific evidence presented at trial as to the
deposits of the Defendant's personal funds into MMD-2 after
August 13, 1982. Had this evidence been knpwn to trial counsel
and presented to the jury, the probability exists that the jury
would have found a lack of sufficient evidence to support the
element of intent to permanently deprive.
The other failures of preparation of investigation itemized
above, when combined with the prejudicial efffect of the uncharged
misconduct evidence and the misleading and confusing jury instructions (discussed infra), had a cumulatively devastating
effect on Defendant Crestani's defense.

Viewing all of these

factors there is a serious question whether br not the trial can
be relied on as having produced a just resulj:,
II.
TRIAL COUNSEL'S REPRESENTATION AT tRIAL FELL
BELOW THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD AND AMOUNTED
TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Given trial counsel's inadequate trial preparation described
above it is no surprise that trial counsel was frustrated in
nearly every attempt to establish an effective defense.

Trial

counsel's hapless attempts through various witnesses on direct
examination to reconstruct financial transactions without complete records or adequate witness preparation were easily impeached.
Trial counsel's cross-examination of the State's witnesses
also suffered from his lack of preparation.

Unarmed with a

thorough knowledge of his case or with the documents from MMD-2
to prove his position, counsel resorted to arguing with the
State's witnesses.
Another devastating blow to the defense occurred because of
trial counsel's failure to object to the admission of irrelevant
and highly prejudicial evidence.

The prosecutor continually

elicited, without objection, testimony that MMD-2 was an interest
bearing escrow account, that Defendant co-mingled his personal
monies with escrow funds and that Alta Title Company kept the
interest earned on the escrow funds.

The State also attempted to

question a witness using the text of a civil statute which
prohibited the co-mingling of personal funds with escrow funds
and required that any interest paid on such account be disbursed
to the escrow owners and not to the title company.
p. 355)

(T. Vol. Ill,

Trial counsel initially objected to reference to this

misleading and dangerous piece of evidence.

Later, however,

trial counsel himself offered the rejected exhibit and it was
admitted.(T. Vol. IV, pp. 492, 493).
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Evidence of uncharged misconduct ffis not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith."

Utah Rules of Evidence 404(b).

The

courts have long recognized that evidence ot misconduct other
than that charged is highly prejudicial.

Such evidence should

not be admitted unless it is probative of an issue in the case
and the probative value out weighs the prejudicial nature of the
evidence.

Rule 403 Utah Rules of Evidence.

In this case

evidence that Defendant co-mingled his own monies in the MMD-2
account in violation of a civil statute has no bearing whatever
on the State's theft charges.

Thus, it follows that the evidence

of the civil statute was not probative and in fact, it was not
even relevant to the case.
ble.

Irrelevant evidence is not admissi-

Utah Rules of Evidence 402.
An accused is entitled to be tried only for the acts he is

charged with committing.
1981).

State v. Lopez, 626 P.2d 483, 485 (Utah

Accordingly, the State should not be allowed to

"besmirch, disgrace or prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the
jury" by evidence of unrelated misconduct.
P.2d 783, 786 (Utah 1977).

State v. Gibson, 565

See also State v| Tanner, 675 P.2d

539, 547 (Utah 1983)
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized phe importance of
raising appropriate objections in a criminal case.
Gray, 601 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1979).
competent counsel is
oc

In State v.

The Cc^urt observed that

"one who will take such actions and present
whatever defenses and interpose whatever objections he
can in honesty anH good conscience justify In tEe
interest of his client."
Although counsel is not required to object when doing so would
futile, State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1982), it is
clear in the case at bar that an objection to this irrelevant and
prejudicial evidence would have been well taken and should have
been made.
Trial counsel's failure to object to the irrelevant and
prejudicial evidence and argument regarding alleged violations of
the civil statute was conduct falling below a reasonable standard
of competency.

The prejudicial nature of this evidence creates a

reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different
if it had been disallowed.
III.
THE TRIM, COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS
TO THE JURY THAT WERE MISLEADING
AND UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL
The purpose of jury instructions is to enlighten, rather
than confuse.

If follows that:

11

[instructions should be clear, explicit, and free
from ambiguities and contradictions; otherwise they may
confuse and mislead the jury.11
Scaggs v. State, 417 P.2d 331, 336 (Okl. Cr. 1966).

If in a

criminal case erroneous instructions might have influenced the
jury's deliberations they are deemed prejudicial and the judgment
should be reversed.

Id.
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The Recitation in the Instructions of a Civil Statute
Forbidding Acts with which Defendant was not Charged was Prejudicial Error,
The Court's instructions to the jury included the following:
Instruction No. 16
You are instructed that the 1laws of the
State of Utah applicable at the pertinent
times in this case provide that a title
insurance agent may engage in th^ escrow,
settlement or closing business, or any
combination of such business, and Operate as
escrow, settlement or closing agenjt provided
that all funds deposited with the agent in
connection with any escrow, sett llement or
closing shall be deposited in a b^nk in a
separate trust account, or account J and such
funds shall be the property of the person or
persons entitled thereto under the provisions
of the escrow, settlement or cloi ing and
segregate [sic] escrow by escrow, isettlement
by settlement, or closing by clos TO in the
records of the agent. These funds shall not
be subject to any debt of the agentt and shall
be used only to fulfill the term^ of the
individual escrow, settlement or closing
under which the funds were accepte , and none
of the funds shall be used until 11 conditions of the escrow, settlement of closing
have been met.
Any interest received or fund^ deposited
with the agent in connection with kny escrow,
settlement or closing which are deposited in
a bank shall be paid over to the 4 e P os i t i n g
party to the escrow, settlement o± closing
and shall not be transferred to th|e account
of the agent.
R at 140. This instruction quotes selected port ions of Utah Code
Ann.

§31-25-26

Instruction

16

(1981) which was in effect during 1982.
is

seriously misleading,

Instruction 16

highlights and draws the jury's attention to allegations of civil
-^7-

misconduct with which the Defendant was not charged and which,
even if proved, was irrelevant to the theft charges.

The preju-

dicial effect of Instruction 16 was compounded by its placement
in the instructions immediately before the four theft instructions.

R at 140-144.

The implication in the instruction that

allegations of misconduct involving the escrow account had
anything to do with proof of the charged crimes is contrary to
law and simply unfair.
Although, in some circumstances, a court may instruct the
jury using statutory language, this is proper only if the
instruction is confined to the issues in the case and does not
mislead the jury.

Day v. Goodwin, 3 Wash. App. 940, 944, 478

P.2d 774, 777 (1970).

Abstract statements of the law, however

correct, should not be given in jury instructions unless they are
geared to the issues in the case being tried.

Gill v. People,

139 Colo. 401, 412, 339 P.2d 1000, 1006 (Colo. 1959).
The issue of compliance with §31-25-26 has nothing to do
with the issue of whether or not the Defendant committed the
charges of theft.

The issue of compliance was therefore not

properly before the jury.

However, because of the tactics and

argument of the prosecutor and the inclusion of Instruction 16,
the jury was surely mislead into believeing that the issue of
compliance somehow was probative evidence of theft.

Because of

this misleading instruction, it is likely that the jury
erroneously viewed Defendant's alleged failure to comply with
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§31-25-26 as evidence of his guilt on the tqheft charges.

The

prosecutor improperly compounded that likelihood by continually
eliciting testimony that Defendant co-mingled funds and that he
did not pay interest to the escrow owners and by focusing on the
claims in his closing argument.

The combination of these factors

surely poisoned the attitude of the jury toward the Defendant and
tainted the verdict.
Other courts have recognized this dangler.

In State v.

Leonard, 292 S.C. 133, 355 S.E.2d 270, 272 I (S.C. 1987), the
defendant was convicted of reckless homicide.

On appeal, the

South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the conviction on several
grounds.

One of the errors the Court noted was that the trial

court, in its instructions to the jury, quoted verbatim a statute
with which the defendant had not been charged.

The South

Carolina Supreme Court noted that the quoted language did not
enlighten the jury regarding the issues to be| decided.

The Court

held that when
the inclusion of [a] non-charged offense has
the effect of confusing the issues the jury
must determine, the statute should not be
read to the jury.
Id. at 273.
Instruction 16 was unnecessary, irrelevant and prejudicial
to the Defendant's right to a fair trial before an impartial
jury.
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B.

Instruction Number 25 Prejudiced the Defendant's Right

to Require the State to Prove Each Element of the Offense Beyond
a Reasonable Doubt.
The court's charge to the jury included the following
instruction:
Instruction No. 25
You are instructed that if
the MMD-2 Account was used as
account then the Defendant had
to use the funds of another for

you find that
an escrow
no authority
his own use.

Instruction No. 25 is logically flawed and legally wrong.
However, even more serious than that, the insidious effect of the
instruction is to establish an irrebuttable presumption of the
truth of a contested

element of the charged offenses.

Instruction No. 25 was simply the last and most serious of the
prosecutor's misguided attempts to convict the Defendant of theft
based upon evidence of unrelated and improper use of an escrow
account.
The logical problem with the instruction is that it sets up
a false syllogism.

It is simply not true that the lack of

Defendantfs authority to use the funds of another flows automatically from the fact that MMD-2 may have ever been used as an
escrow account.

The account may have also been used to maintain

the un-escrowed funds of Defendant's wife.
certainly used for the funds of Alta Title.

The account was
Because the owner of

the funds withdrawn by the Defendant was nfever established at
trial, the funds could have been funds belonging to a person or
entity that gave authority to the Defendant for their use.
The problem is that Defendant never claimed at trial that he
used the funds of another.
own funds from the account.

His defense was that he withdrew his
Therefore, Instruction 25 seems to

have no relevance to the issues in the case.
Because the Defendant may or may not hive had authority to
use the funds of another in the MMD-2 accounjt it is logically and
legally incorrect and prejudicial to imply that the fact the
account was ever used as an escrow account eliminates the possibility of authority whether or not the fiinds withdrawn were
escrowed funds.
The most ominous implication that can be drawn from this
Instruction is that it eliminates the requirement that the State
prove the element of lack of authorization beyond a reasonable
doubt.

The Instruction can be read to mean] in connection with

Instruction 16, that if the account was usedj as an escrow account
then even the Defendant's money became "fundss of another11 by the
mere fact they were deposited into this account and the Defendant
somehow automatically lost the authority thereafter to use them
as his own.
It may be that the Instruction was meant to say that if the
Defendant withdr ew escrowed funds from MMD-2 then the jury is
instructed to find he had no authority to do so. Of course, even
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this statement is legally and factually incorrect and would have
the effect of unlawfully shifting the burden of proof on the
issue of authorization to the Defendant.

If the State proved

that Defendant withdrew escrowed funds, it would have to prove
that Defendant had no permission to do so.
No matter how it is read, Instruction 25 allows the jury to
logically link the finding of no authority to a finding that
MMD-2 was used as an escrow account.

Such an instruction vio-

lates the Defendant's right to due process.
Due process requires the State to prove "every ingredient of
an offense beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .ff Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 215, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2329 (1977).

,f

[A] jury's

verdict cannot stand if the instructions . . . . do not require
it to find each element of the crime under the proper standard of
proof . . . ." Cabana v. Bullock,

U.S.

, 106 S.Ct. 689, 696

(1986).
Because the main contested issue in the case was whether or
not the money was the property of another withdrawn without
authority, the instruction is in effect an instruction for a
directed verdict.
In People vs. Figueroa, 41 Cal. 3d 714, 715 P.2d 680, 686,
(1986), the Court recognized that a jury instruction may have the
effect of a directed verdict although not stated in so many
words.
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The prohibition against directed verdicts "includes perforce situations in which
the Judge's instructions fall short of
directing a guilty verdict but which nevertheless have the effect of so doing by
eliminating other relevant considerations if
the jury finds one fact to be true.'1
Citing United States v. Hayward, 420 F.2d [L42, 144 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
In the case at bar, Instruction 25 tells the jury that upon
a finding that MMD-2 was ever used as an escrow account any
withdrawal of MMD-2 monies by Defendant was without authority
even if the monies withdrawn were not escrowed monies.
This instruction in effect commands the Jury to ignore the
evidence that Defendant had authority to withdraw funds, or that
he withdrew his own funds.
The instruction is so insidious in effect that by itself it
casts doubt upon the fairness of the jury's Iverdict.
C.

The Combined Effect of Instructions 16 and 25 was to

Grossly Confuse the Issues and Mislead the Jury.

Either Instruc-

tion 16 or Instruction 25, taken alone, would constitute reversible error in this case.

These two instructions taken together

have the perverse synergistic effect of moile than doubling the
prejudice of either instruction alone.
On one hand, the jury was subject to ai Darrage of evidence
and argument to the effect that the Defendant co-mingled personal
monies with escrow funds.

The jury was then instructed that it

is illegal to co-mingle personal and escrow bonies.

Finally, the

jury was given an instruction implying that withdrawal of money
from an escrow account without more established the element of
unauthorized control for the purpose of the theft charge.
The apparent purpose of this coordinated attack was to
convince the jury that the alleged misuse of the escrow account
was some how connected with, and required conviction on, the
charges of theft.

The probability is great that this abusive and

unfairly prejudicial tactic worked.

The likelihood is high that

the combined effect of these two instructions was to justify the
conviction of the Defendant, not on the evidence of theft, but on
the basis of the prejudicial flood of uncharged misconduct
evidence.

IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE A
SPECIFIC INTENT INSTRUCTION
Defendant offered four instructions on specific intent.
at 106, 117, 118, 125)

(R

These are reproduced as Exhibit 2 in the

Addendum for convenience of the Court.

The Court's charge to the

jury, however, included none of these instructions.
Because theft is a specific intent crime, a defendant is
entitled to an instruction on specific intent; An instruction on
general intent alone is inadequate.

People v. Mingo, 181 Colo.

390, 392, 509 P.2d 800, 801 (Colo. 1973).

Since specific intent

is an element of the crime, it must be proved beyond a reasonable
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doubt.

People v. Erickson, 695 P.2d 804, 8(j)5 (Colo. App. 1985);

State v. Anderson, 102 Idaho 464, 466, 63^. P.2d 1223, 1225
(1981).

Accordingly, the jury should be instructed regarding the

meaning of specific intent and the State's burden of proof.
In State v. Bachicha, 84 N.M. 397, 503 P.2d 1175 (N.M. App.
1972) , the defendant was tried on the charjge of theft of an
automobile.

In the court's instructions to the jury, the charg-

ing statute was quoted:

"Any person who sh^ll take any vehicle

intentionally and without consent of the ovrhor thereof shall be
guilty of a felony."

j^d. at 1175.

An additional instruction

read as follows:
You are instructed that the intent! with which
an act is done is a mental procesis and, as
such, generally remains hidden within the
mind where it was conceived and is seldom, if
ever, susceptible of proof by direct evidence, but must be inferred and established
by the acts, conduct and doings of the
persons having such intent and from the facts
and circumstances surrounding such acts,
conduct and doings, and in determining the
intent with which the defendant in this case
committed the act or acts charged in this
indictment, if you find that he diki so, it is
proper for you to consider his acts, conduct
and doings, together with all othejr facts and
circumstances proved on the trialj of this
case.
Id. at 1176.

The State claimed that the twb instructions, when

read together, adequately instructed the jury on criminal intent.
The appellate court found, however, that the instructions were
insufficient to inform the jury of the importance of the element
of intent.

The court observed that

lf

[t]he jjury must have more

than a suggestion.

It must be instructed on the essential

element of a 'conscious wrongdoing.f"

Id.

As in Bachicha, the court's instructions in the case at bar
gave the jury no more than a suggestion.

The elements in-

structions superficially address intent by the use of "purpose to
deprive" language.

(R at 141, 142, 143, 144) Instruction 15

offers a definition of intent using language similar to that
offered in Bachicha.

Nowhere does the court define specific

intent nor does it inform the jury of the importance of specific
intent as an element which must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The court was offered an instruction defining specific
intent and distinguishing it from general intent.

(R at 118)

Counsel also offered the court three additional specific intent
instructions any one of which would have satisfied the requirements of Bachicha.

(R at 106, 117, 125)

The court's failure to

instruct on this important element left the jury utterly without
direction.
The element of specific intent is extremely crucial in the
instant case since Defendant's defense was based in part on the
fact that he had no intent to permanently deprive anyone of the
money in MMD-2.

Accordingly, Defendant's convictions should be

reversed.
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CONCLUSION
This record provides overwhelming

evidence of trial

counsel's lack of effective and necessary preparation and
investigation and the resultant unavailability of evidence
establishing good defenses to the charges.

The problem was

exacerbated by the admission of extremely prejudicial and
inadmissible evidence at trial and misleading, prejudicial and
unlawful instructions to the jury.

These fjactors combined to

allow an unjust conviction of this defendant in what must be
described as a gross miscarriage of justice^

These errors may

only be remedied by a new trial.
Defendant Crestani requests that this Court grant him that
remedy.
Respectfully submitted,
DATED this

day of April, 1988.

SESSIONS & MO^)RE

JOHN F. CLARK
JOHN K. WEST
Attorneys for Defendant Crestani
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT B

INSTRUCTION NO.

To constitute the crime ^charged in the information there
must be the joint operation of two essential Elements, an act
forbidden by law and an intent to do the act.
Before a defendant may be found guilty o£ a crime the
prosecution must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that under
the statute described in these instructions defendant was forbidden
to do the acts charged in the information, and that he specifically
intended to commit those acts.
As stated before, the law never imposes upon a defendant
in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or
producing any evidence.

He has no burden of prfoof whatsoever.

oooi

INSTRUCTION NO.
In t h e case of c e r t a i n crimes i t i s riecessary t h a t

in

a d d i t i o n to t h e i n t e n d e d a c t which c h a r a c t e r i s e s t h e o f f e n s e ,

the

a c t must be accompanied by a s p e c i f i c o r p a r t i c u l a r i n t e n t w i t h o u t
which such crime may not be committed.
Thus, i n t h e crimes of t h e f t such as are charged i n t h e
i n f o r m a t i o n of t h i s c a s e , a n e c e s s a r y element M t h e e x i s t e n c e i n
t h e mind of t h e defendant of t h e s p e c i f i c i n t e n t t o o b t a i n o r
e x e r c i s e u n a u t h o r i z e d c o n t r o l of t h e p r o p e r t y fyf t h e p e r s o n s named
i n each count x>7ith a purpose t o d e p r i v e t h e owitier t h e r e o f .
And, u n l e s s such s p e c i f i c i n t e n t so e x i s t s , t h e crimes
charged were n o t committed.

INSTRUCTION NO.
" S p e c i f i c i n t e n t 1 1 means t h a t i n t e n t fwhich i s p r e c i s e l y
formulated and i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a l l othetr i n t e n t s , t h a t
is definite, p a r t i c u l a r ,

it

r e s t r i c t e d , explicit], exact, limited, -

andthe o p p o s i t e of g e n e r a l

intent.

nnOli 8

INSTRUCTION NO. > 7,

The crime charged against the defendant i n t h i s case
i s a serious crime which requires proof of s p e c i f i c i n t e n t before
the defendant can be convicted.

Specific interit, as the term

i n p l i e s , means more than the general i n t e n t tc commit the act.
To e s t a b l i s h s p e c i f i c i n t e n t the prosecution nu^st prove t h a t the
defendant knowlingly did an a c t which the law forbids, or knowingly
f a i l e d to do an act which the law r e q u i r e s , purposely intending
to v i o l a t e the law.

Such i n t e n t may be ctetermi]ned from a l l of

the facts and circumstances surrounding the cas^.
An act or f a i l u r e t o a c t i s

?l

knowingljyff dene, i f dene

v o l u n t a r i l y and i n t e n t i o n a l l y , and not because )f mistake or
accident or other innocent reason.

